That was the basis for the resurrection of the party later on. Mrjthout Stalin's howledge or approval, Miladyslaw Gomujka was elected secretary general in German-occupied Warsaw in November 1, I dominated the Poiish Provisional Government of Nationat Unity Gomugka muted Marxist revolutionary goals in an attempt to form a national front with the PPS, the intelligent"ia, and the peasantry. When this strategy failed to gain broader popular szlpport, the PPR gradtlally coopted the other political parties or drove them undergmund.
U-rtder pressure from the Western Af.
Aiter the phony elections in January , the PPR was the master of the political scene. Mikd;ljczyk fled the country in N'Rventbecme P1 R had some latitude to decide domestic policy in the early postwar period. Communism The German communists had a stronger base in the German workng ctass. Monarrhism, democracy, and fascism had failed Germmyf and trhe German communists could. Those who spent the war in the Soviet Union were Stalin" lackeys; the KPD's association with the Soviet occu- 'There Are No Guc7d Germalzs'" 23 patim authorities furthr tarnished its image, Many Red Army soldiers inflicted their revenge on the Germm people, and the Soviets wantonly extracted repnrations from their zone.
The SPD's more moderate socialism. Wven if Stalin did not want a division of Germany initially, his undemocratic tactics to consolidate communist control in the Soviet znne and Poland contributed to the emerging Cold. Pieck studied under Luxexnburg at the party l4 'There A re No Guc7cl G e r mns '" school in Berlin, and stamchXy defended her against revisionists in the party who rejected her ortl.
Pieck narrowly escaped with his own life the day raeticai right-wing in Berlin in January Even the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in had not changed that; in and , the Weimar Republic and the Solriet Union signed cooperative agreements that were inpart directed agalnst the new Polish state.
He did not see an old ally in the KPD; he saw instead a party that had embraced Luxemburg's internationalism, obsequiously sanctioned Stalin's liquidation af the KPP, and approved of the partition of Poland in After the war, Gomuika declared that "the German horse must have its legs broken regardless of whether that horse is ridden by a Nazi ar a Social Democrat.
During the Nuremberg trials in the fall of , Polish officials criticized former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill for arguing that Germany as a whole should not be punit;hed for the war. Polish authorities refected offers of cooperation from, the German Leftists in the former German territoritls. The Poli. Ufbrirht pointed out that many of the German communists had lost connections to the movement during their years in Nazi prisons; by the end of the war, m y had become m e d e r s of the SPD or the CDU.
He declartld Germans living in Poland wollld not be allowed to wote. The SEU was not invited to Szklarska Porqba for the fisst meeting of Cominform, in Septentber , and was not informd until October that the meeting had taken place,. He did agree that '"when two antagoni. In April 1,, the editor of the leipziger Zeitrrng wrote a letter to the PPR Central ittee mquestsing honest information on the reconstruction of Polmd and life in the corntry in gc3neral.
The newspaper gellerally portrayed the Czechoslovaks in a more favorabk light. Tn the suspicious atmosphere of the times, buwever, there was little clbjectiwe repclrting m either side. Few East Germans or Poles, including party members, beljcved in this propaganda. In March, the Poljsh journal N o w Drogi vigomustp criticized two Polish authors for writing a book emphasizjng t-he cmtinuity of German territorial expansior. They were accused oE harborh g "hyper-anti-Germmf' attitudes.
Ulbricht achowledged the presence of a strong nationalist element in t-he SET and the trade unions, a d declared that mtj-Polish anirudes were dangerous and unacceptable. Wetzel told Grotewohl and Pieck that the SED prtrss should pay closer attention to such importmt speeches in order to cdtivate what Wetzel termed "the weak seedlistg of Gcrman-Polish relations. Each party engaged in a witch hunt of alleged "Etoists":? The 20 'There A re No Guc7cl G e r mns '" communist lezlders in Eastern Europe now w r k e d under the strain of slavishly adhering to Moscow's directives.
Tito's ouster and the heightened East-West tensions durhg the Berlin blockade in the summer of 1. When Stalin delnanded p d e r ideological and political conformity from the communist parties in , the SED easily fell into line. He opposed TX"itotsexcommunication from Cominform, warning fiat communist unity wodd suffer.
In contrast to the purges in the Bulgarian, Hungarian, :Romanian, and Czechosiovak parties, however, the Polish communists did not execute their okvn.. Connugka, was arrested but never brought to trial. A few years later, Bicmt told Khmshchev, 'To tell yoll the truth, 1 myself d d t h a w what the charges are and why he" in j jai3,"E Bierut replaced Gomulka as party secretary, and Cyranftiewicz took over leadership of the PPS from Edvard OsBbka-Morawski, in part because Osribka-Morwski was opposed to the unification of the two parties.
The SED viewed the trip as a turning point in relations with the Polish commmists. He tried. U'tbrieht exaggerated the level of trust that he had develsped, with Polish dficials, however, claiming that Cyrmkiewicz wap; fully satisfied that the SEC had overcome its rclvisionist tendencies-K"UIhricht said, that his delegation had ""succeeded in winning the trust of the Polish comrades for our party and our party leadership. Netitrs Drzitschlurzd devoted severat extensive fsont-page articles to the visit, interpreting it as a significant breakthrough for the recognition of the SEE?
Tryhzlrza Ltldu made only brief mention of the talks. For the first few years after the war, Pdish communists not: only ipored their German counterparts but exploited Poles' hatred of all Germms to attract adlaere11t. The Poles possessed more diplomatic leverage than the German communil;ts in the early postwar period, but ly'itofsexpulsion from Corninform, and the smb5equem. The comrrritted Stalinj. Until Stalin" death in , UXbricht" cmfidence grew as did his resolve to promote East German interests in his dealings with the Poles. Neither the postwar communist gover ent in Polmd nor the SED in the Soviet zone had any legitimate claim to power.
As a result, relations between the Polish and German communists were also artificial, conducted with the howledge that Moscow might purge them at m y time. Another founder was the infamous Botshevik inquisitor Feliks Dzier2yfiski. See M. Stalin a h o alleged that virtually the entire W P was infiltrated with agents of the Polish intelligence seivice. Quoted in Woy A. Gomuika's native communist group included Zenon Kliszko, Marian Spychalski, and Wladysjaw fliehkc3wsk. Martin's Press, , p. See Coutouvidis and Reynolids, bland p. Manfred Wilke, "Mommunismus in Beutschland und Rahmenbedingmgen polititischer Handelns nach " Communism in Germany and the cmtingencies of political exchange , in Manfred Wilke, eed.
See R. Martin" Press, Z , p. Dallin adds that Stalin" long. She alienated many Polish and German communists with these views. Dietz, Q ,pp. She writes that "the more Rosa Z,uxemburg stocd up for 'revolutionary Masxism' the more she was iscllateb. The Polish tradition of herclism and martyrdom and the German traditian of conforming and consematism were unreconcilable. George L. Ezlrupe 16, no. Pieck also served with Gottwald on the political secretariat of the Communist Xnternational in the s and s.. Stern, Ulhridzf, p. Ulbricht" article appeared in Die Well. New York: Columbia University Press, , pp.
Dziewanowski, bEa7. Quoted in Georg W Strcrbet, Beufscr? Born in the Awtro-Hungarian province of Galicia, Gomuika attended a German school where he acquired a working knowledge of German. When the Sctviets occupied Ltvdw in the fall of , he fled tcr I-tis home town of Krosno, where he took his chances with the German occupiers.
This ministry administered the German territories occupied by Poland in I1 winter ' p. The disputed area of Teslin Czieszen Silesia was one of the main issues dividing the two countries until , when Stalin brokmed a campromise, CXos Lzadu, June 25,, g. Beck, , p. World War 11 Poznah: t"dy8amictwo Poznafiskie, , p. See C b s lizlldcl's reports on the Nuremberg trials in Spternber, See G b s ttidu from May to April , See, for example, G2os Ludu, Bctt3ber 22, , p, 2.
See C2os tudu, April 23,, p. According i-o Weit, who was Gomuzka" interpreter in s and 19Ms, these farmer Nazis were even more loyal to Utbricht because he could use their past to incriminate them. Glos Ludzl, June 30, , pp. Loth, Stnlizzs Mnbeliebfes Kl'lzd, p.
Procacci, ed. Tybzrnn Lzldzt, December 16,, g. The book was Janwz Pajewski Appendix No. C1os Ludu, Sptember 23,, p. Martin" Press, ' p. See Ann L. Ackermann was rehabilitated in Dziewanow-ski, 'The Commjranist h r f y c f h k n d , p. Gomulka was purged from the PZPR in , and arrested in Five years later, he returned to lead the party.
Einfwit Unity 3, no. Nezges Deutscftland, January l, , p. Sikora writes that Dahlem" visit was much more thoroughfy reported in the Polish press than Ulbricht" "somewhat toneless visit. Nezges Deufseizlalzd, November 21,, p S Lzldu, October 24,, g. Pieck, et al. Trybunn Lzddu, February 11,, p.
Tqbunn Lzldzt, December 17,, g. Notes on Ochab" visit, unsigned, undated, ea. Trybum Ludzr, January 27; p. Trybunn Lzddu, January 26,, p-4, TyEizlw Ludir, Bctclber 4,4? The conflict between Poland and Germany over Uppefiilesia after World. War I was a prolsgw to the dispute over the ader-Neisse border, :Rosa Luxemburg had. President Frankli. At first, the Polish Provisional Government hesitated to make a legal claim to the German territories, The Poles did not want to set a precedent to change Poland's borders; such a change could mean the permanent loss of the eastern territmies now occupied by the Soviet Union.
Yhe g o v e m m t turned its energies to the administration and develogmmt of the Western 'TtJrritories,Io in part to create a fait accompli before the Allies complekd a German peace treatyell The KPD, like all the German political parties, was adamantly opposed to the new border. At first, the party avoided making public statements in the hope that the establishment of LeEtist governments in Germany and Poland would aid a revision of the Odes-Neisse lhe. Such references elicited vehernent protests irom the Polish Military Mission in Berlin.
The party organ Ilt. For the time being, the KPD wanted to leave historical claims out of it. W e n he mgrily attacked the Polish government for its obdurate border m d repanationd. He warned Soviet officials that the ader-Neisse border would be the cause of a hture Polish-German conflict, and would jeopardize the Soviet tlniods longterm security. Poland" Claims to the Oder-Pifeisse Border Mast Poles supported the ader-Neisse border, especially given the slim chance that Poland would recover its eastern territories.
Polish officids argued that Germany" economic and military potential would be decisively weakened by ceding Silesia and Pomerania to Poland. These territories would also give Poland a stronger and more balanced agricultural and industrial economyB21 Poiish officials wercl. Gontulka often referred to the Odcr-NQsse line as the '"new Piast borcier.
She estimated that there were about ,U80 Lusatim Sorbs living in the Soviet zone of Germmy, and said that they had cheered the Polish army on its way to Berlh at the elnd of the war, Some had carried plxards that read, "A Slav nation lives here, the Lusatian Sorbs. At Yaita, Churchill h i t i d y objected to the forced removal of the Germans, but Staljsl argued that most of them were fleeing from the advancing Red Army anyway Churtlhill did not press the isszxe.
Although the SED could not promote national interests as openly as the Poles, the party" stubborn opposition to the new Polish-Germm border clmfirmed what the Polish communists fcared the most-that the ghost of Rapallo and the Nazi-Soviet Pact would return h the form of a deal behnieen the Stalin and the SER to revise the border in Germany" ffavor.
The party added that the Potsdam agreements did not sanction Polmd" sanxation of Germm lmds. Foreign Minister Idygmunt Modzelewski mgued that the reduction of German territory would cmtribute ta the securiv of Europe by weakening Germany forcver: "'fGcmany's] borders along the Oder and the 1Cheirr. He added that his party mcagnized that Poland was developing sacidism, in wfii.
Pieck and Grotewohf speculated that the Soviets wodd return the oil basin around Lwbw to PoIand m d then revise the Geman-Polish border, bat Sta:lin had no such plans. The SED has certain information that this wiX1:happen. President tioleslaw tiierut stated unequivocally trhat the "'recovered territories on the Oder, N'eisse, and Baltic are Polish now and will a h a y s be PoXish.
Colonel S. T'id'panov reported to Moscow that allowing the SED to lobby for a border change was a risky policy: "We run the danger of ailwing the party to revert to extreme nationalism. Soviet Fortrign Minister yacheslaw Molotov said that the Polish administration of the German areas east of the ader-Neisse Rivers had been sanctioned at Potsdm, and that it was a fait accompli, that had little chance of being reversed at a future peace conference.
Molotov concluded that "all that remains is to wish the Polish friends success in their huge reconstruction efforts in the Western liC3rritories.
The Cold War Timeline
Germm communjsts. Modzelewski replied that an international committee was studylng small changes in the border, but refused further comment. M In Febmary, the Polish Mllitav Mission reported that Pieck, Ulbncht, and even Grotewohl were now moving toward "the right attitude in the border matter. P r w i n wrote Miarsaw that the Germans expected the Poles to have a "rigid hatrcd" of them, but were surprised by the Poles" invitat h n and the officesskpenness and hospitality.
Kg Prawin. What is worse, trhe SED position dms not airn to cure the Geman people, but exacehates its chauvinist sickness. Prawin had no syxnpathy for this line of thklkhg. Sbortly behw the m e e t a , Franz Dahlem declared that "the final delineation of the border, whether the border should run east or west of the Neisse, is still open. The SER is as little respmsible as any othrr G e r m n party for thr eastern border tbat was decided in Two months later, U.
President Harry Tmman dccided to aid the anti-communist governments in Turkey and Greece, laying the groundwork for the e w r g h g W. The foreign ministersheet;ing in Moscow failed to reach an agreement on Germany; in July the Soviets rc3jected the Marshall Plm, which included the controversial reconstruction of the Western zones of Cermany As the nllied positinns hardened that spring, a h a 1 settlement on Germany seemed remote. For the first time, Polish officials promoted the idea that there were some '"progressive" Germans, namely, the German communists.
In April, Gomuika told Clos Lzidu. In May, Prawin told Pieck that his government was disappointed in the SED" persistent and opportunistic use of the border issue, He asked the SEB leader whether there was truth to the rumor that the SED, in meetbgs with the Soviets in Moscon; had proposed a border change. Although Stalin and Molotov had told Piwk in January that there would be no changes im the border, Pieck n w told Prawj;n that thercz might be some very sntall border rectifications in Germany" ffavor, but no major ones, Once again, Prawin left t.
For tacticd rclasons, Grotewohl supported the payment of reparations for the war, but then argued. The Soviets walked out of the A t lied Control Comxnission in March, and,in response to a currmcy refom in the Western zones in june,they blockaded the land routes from the Western zones to Berlin.
The Tito Doctrine
The unification of Gemany appeared to be a remote possibility, and the SED became more cmfident that the Soviets would continllc to support the party's grip on power in the zone. The SEE? The Polish. H e sutjge"t"d, however, that it would. Mission officers informed Uertkger that if t-he CDU publicly declared its support of the ader-Neisse border, the Polish people would not be opposed to trade with Germany.
The cause was the dominance of the reactionary forces in Germmy, whidn had particularly strong support h East Prussia and Silcsia,"l"7 ert revisionism was still rampant in the SED, however. At a workshop for East German journajists at the Brandcnburg SED Party School, one reporter pointed out that "Comrade Pieck declared in , and again in , that the last word had not been spoken in rr.
Why do you [the SED leadershjpj suddenly say that the decision is final? The diptornat reported that when he suggested that such an economic argwemt could be used to justif? In November , the SED p r o p o x h peace tstlaty that would unify 13erlin and establish one central, democratic German government. The SED leadershjp no lolnger tc,lera. The nekvspaper observed that the audience reaction to Pieckfsstatement was ""especially warm" and that "'the SED shows Germany the way to peaceful cooperation with Polanli.
Neisse as the border of peace and the fight itgahst all revisionist hfluences am the first conditions for understanding with the Polish nation. They were fully aware that many SED members did not accept the partvs offic. To further cmsolidate control over the former German territories and precludc a change in the border, the Polish gove ent dissolved the Ministry of Recovered Territories at thc etnd of and formally integrated the krritories into the Polish state.
Warsaw sent the Allies a diplomatic note emphasizing that the Potsdam agreewnts provided the basis for t-he security of Europe, and that Poland supported the politied and economic unity of Germany. The demrche brwght no rcsponse. Motes 1. Pieck letter to the Poles, undated, ca. Brarld lnnzlnr bis April Collected speeches and writings. The peace treaty between Germany and the Allies was finally signed in , 9.
The Oder-Neiisseborder remained in Legal limbo until a reunited Germany reeagnized the border in The term Westera Territories will be wed to denote the German territories of lli east of the Qder and Neisse Rivers. Legal opinion by Dr. The German half of the city was bter rmamed Wilhetm Pieck Stadt. Oldenbourg tieslag, 19";79 ,p. Walter Ulbricht, Die E? Gius Lirdlt, February 21,, p Wadyslaw Gomuika headed this ministry 27, G b s Lz-ldu, July 23, , p. Krsrszewski points out that the mcjst of the '7.
According to Baleu; approximately 4 million Germans fmm Poland first settfed in the S v i e t zone of Germany. Glos Ludz-t,Sytember 16,, p. GZos LuAir, August 27,, p,2, Gomulka, O probbtnie Nr'emieckint, p. See Lehmann, Der Oder-Neisse-f onpikl, pp. Meues l;teufsdzttrnd,September 14,, p. Nezges Deufseizlalzd,October 1,, p. Naimark states that "the Soviets dismissed Grotewohlk resistance to acceptance of the finality of the Qder-Neisse border with Poland as a sign of his petit bourgeois past.
Nezges Deufscizlalzd,Sqtember 14,, p. The newspaper devoted its first two pages to attacks on Bymes' speech. Cctmufka, O problemie Niemieckim, pp. Nezdes Deufsehland, Scrptember 18,, p. The Sucial Democrats received 49 percent of the vote in Berlin. Glos Ludtr, 0ctcr;ber29,, p. Glos Ludil, February 16, , p.
Przebbj-Jareckinotes of a meeting with. At this meeting Pieck mentioned the island of Uznam near Swinoujjcie for a possible border revision. See Ra! Prawin to the Polish Foreign Ministry, undated, ca.
United States Relations with Russia: The Cold War
Politik, 1li , p. Martin's 13ress, , pp. Vierheller, 1Sulerz und die Deltfscl-zland-Frnge, p. They did, not necessarily want a unified Germny or a new peace tmaty that reversed the Potsdam dccisims on the Polish-German border, but an artificial East Geman state was not a genuine parantee oE the status quo either. The SED kaders hoped that an official recopition of 'l-he Oder-Neistie border would enhance their standing with Poland and the other communist states.
Pdand recognized the German Democratic Republic on October H, , m d in November the two countries exchanged diplomatic representatives. Now he proclaimed that ""theOder-Neisse border is for us a border of peace, which m k c s possible a friendly relationship with the Polish people.
The two sides also initialed accords on economic and cultural cooperation. There, where for centuries d y anger flourished, through German fault we want to confr? Rierut reciprocated Pieck"s visit bp goLng to Berlin in April Once again, nothing but kind w o d s wew exhanged in public. Bierut thmked the East Germans fnr their "musual hospitaZiQ and M,endshipef""7m Ulbricht went to Warsaw a m t h later, he sotenrnly declared that '"now there are no more difkrences between democratic Germans and the Peoples' Po1:and,.
Relations were not what they appeared. With time, 1 saw with incrclasing clarity that it was Soviet foreign gdicy that was the actual beneficiary them, because the twaty helped their hegemony over Central Elzrope. The W s t Cermm press accurately reported that the SED was having serious problelns in justifying the treaty to the East German peopie. For example, during the visit of a Polish delegation to t h Goethe celcbratim in Weimar in November , an SET functionary was asked when Silesia would return to Germny.
His reply echoed Pieck's mguntent ol a few years earlier: '"After the signing oi the peace treaty and when the Germans show proof of [their] democratic cor. Nonetkless, he reported that most GDR officials "lacked arguments confirming its [the border 'S] legitirnacy. By September , eight East Germm fjshermm and two of their fishing boats were in Polish c u s t d y 'The East German gove demanded l-heir return, and called for a maritime qreernent to prevent future disputes.
The Poles still see Germms as enemiesand vice versa. In N o v d e r , Ubrieht told Izydorczyk in confjcience that the SED was havhg difficulty in overcoming people's chauvhistic and. WLhricht said that the party needed to instill mom political indockination, especially in the Guben and Frankfurt areas and eastern S a , , y and Lusatia, where popular opposition to the border was particularly strcmg.
An interpmtation is ofkm spread Ihat a united Germany kviX. She answered, "Then I would go home! But there were no assurances that the Potsdarn agreements would be the basis for negotidions. West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer rejected the idea, although t-he crverbre was probably sincere. The Soviet acquisition of the atomic b o l b , uverestirn. Korean War made a compromise with Moscow nearly impossible," The "lesson" of Munich infomed both sides; the West woufd not relinquish any part of Germany if it could fall under Soviet influence, and Stalin interpreted Munich as a capitalist deal to provid,e Hitler with a springboard for a wm against t-he Soviet Union..
There was little hope for serious negotiations on Germany; Grotewohl's proposal went n o h e r e. In March , while discussions continued over the rearmament of West Germany, Stalin made one last proposal for a unified, neutral, and demilitarized German state. The GDR leadership enlisted Poland" ssupport in gain. Pieck evoked the Rapdo Treaty as a precedmt in Soviet-German cooperation, alt-hough fie h e w full well that a call for a new li'apalfo, which was in part an anti-Polish agreement, was an affront to all Poles, communj. Soviet troops remained in East Germmy; but the sccupation was officially over.
The Soviets cautioned Ulbricht not to push the reforms too fast, however, for fear not only of alienating the East German population but of ending all hope for communism to gain a foot. Molotov rcmernbered that "it tufned out that the German comrades began talking at the top of their voices about buitding sociaiism without having laid the proper grolandwork for it.
No one could, be sure who was a Soviet agent or a VVestem spy. Shortly after the founding of the C;DR i,n , a porter at the Warsaw train station probably spoke for most Poles when be told Bmdzki that ""fo not believe in the democratic Gemans [in the GDR].. These prejudices were evident in various ertchanges; for instance, in May , the head of t. The Polish Diplomatic Missim in Berlin was disappointed in the East German governmnt's lackluster efforts to promole friendship with Poland.
Foreign Mjnistry official Fritz Grosse told Polish dlplornat Stianisiaw Dodin that these measures were necessary ""tocreate cmtrol and order. Even the SET recognized the problem. The partyfs choice for chief cJf mission, dramatist fiiedrich Wlf, protested the assignment, but to no avail,. Polish officials were often no more hospitable to the East German diplomats in Poland. Wolf complained that "it isn't easy for a German living in Poland. You are watched with complete suspicion. Stefan Mcymann replaced Kundermann in the faIl of Heymam had previously served as head of the SEWSDepartment of Cuiture, where, according to Grmmt, he had tolerated too much ""decadent-"and "abstract" art.
Heymann helped raise morale at the embassy, but East German djplomats still tried to awoid the assipment. Most party and government officials remained inctiffercnt to Poles, if not openly hostile. I'he rrtixcd idecllogical messages that were cornillg out of Moscow in put the commmnist parties in the Soviet bloc on. The Stalinists worried that their past hdiscrctions w d d cost them their jabs, or worse, Q6 Myth of the SfrafirziskBrofherftood their freedom or their lives, The first serious test to communist rule in East: Germany begm on June 17, , with a workersf strilce in East Berlin.
W e n th,e uprising spread to cities thmughout the GDR, the Soviet army deployed troops and tanks to suppress it. K" Ironically the June uprising saved the Ulbricht rkgirne, m d ended alS serious thoughts that Moscow might bave had about a new demarche on German unif ration. Dertinger CDLT was sacked and arrested on spy charges a few weeks later, an embarrassment for fie Poles. One newsman concluded that "Ulbricht is viewed in Poland as a man who hates Polmd. The SEVs central organs remained fimly in, charge of all.
HI3 East German Foreip Ministry offitrial Max Keifson was genuinety surprised when the Polish cuih;lral attach4 inEast Berlin, Helena Jakubawska, told him that her gove m t had not issued the s m e kind of restrictions. Jakubowska s a d that she was having trouble doing her job because of te East German law, to which KelJson replied somewhat dishgenuously, "ln no case do we have the intention of impedbg your workem The East Gerent intclntionally kept Polish officials in the dark about its intern4 affajrs.
Izydsrczyk responded that in contrast to the GDR, the Polish t;owemmc. Grotebvohl suggested that the Poles review the policy with the new foreign ministes, Lothar Bolz, but he, too, iporc? They said that the l w was an intemal affair and expected Polish diplomats to respect itelO7 Polish-East German relations in Stalin" smpim were mircd han atmosphere of distmst and paranoia. Stdin" ccommunists were a camorra of sycophnnts, not an aUiancc by choice. The normalcy m d stability that Stalin had brought to cornmmnist party relations in, the early s broke down after his death.
In addition to their greater political inutonoq the sateilites soon began to reassert their economic htercsts. As the ptitical and economic fadt lines dividing Eu, rope weakened, the Polish government began to reassess the benefits of its trade with the Soviet bloc. German repatriation from Poland was also a source of lfiction between the East German and Polish communists after the war. In the mids, B o r n began to lobby Warsaw to allow mow Geman emigration. East Berlk demanded equal treatment in this matter, but never got it. Trybzinn Lildrr, October 26, "3 p. Martin's Press, , pp. Myttr ofthe Stntinisl Brafherlmod 69 4.
Trybzinck tudu, October 20,, p- 1. Leuschner notes on Ulbricht et al. Tybunn Lzldzt, July 7,, p. Bybzrnn Lzidzr, December 19,, g. Qldenbourg krlag; , p, " Fischer obsei-ves that relations between the GDR and Poland did not suddenly improve as a result of the Zgorzetw agreement, 70 Myth of the SfrafirziskBrofherftood Myttr ofthe Stntinisl Brofherlmod 71 Martin" Press, , pp. Wettig argues that Adenauer rejected the ofkr because he did not want SEB or Swiet interference in West Germany, Wettig, in cmtrast to Loth, tzrrites that "the propclsal submitted by GrotewohX was clearly not serious offer for negotiations,'"t is unlikely that Stalin would have given up on the SED and the GDR without some significant concessions in return, such as Western withdrawal fmm West Berlin and West Germany, but his main goal in the early s was to prevent West Getmany" remilitarination, not to hang an to the GDR, See, for example Ann L.
Berlin: Akademie Verlag; , p. Wettig contends that the SED was confident that nothing would come of the dernarche, and that after Stalin died and Beria raised the possibility of abandoning the GDR, Molotctov said that Stalin would never have done that. Wettig says that the note was intended to put pressure on the Adenauer government and destabillize it from the Left; see also Andrei Gromyko, Memories London: Hutchinson, , p.
See Norman Nairnark, tc,?
AIbert Resis, ed. Dee, , g. Myttr ofthe Stntinisl Brafherlmod 73 The Polish R e view, no. Notes on Stoph and Kling" visit to the P0znai. Because officials from the East German Ministry of Foreign and Domestic Trade were not covered under these regulatians, they enjoyed greater freedom to meet with foreign officials about-economic matters, SLansky was the Czechosfovak communist executed in In his memoirs, he says that the Polish communists were united with the Russians in the struggle againl;l:capitalism, even to the point of stating that Fetix Dzieriyxisky the founder of the Soviet secret police, had the respect of the Polish people: "This atl spea ks of the fraternal relationship of the Syviet Union to our atLies and bmthers, the Polish people.
Dutles posited the idea of a neutral Germany as well, but by that thinking was wer, Ein RGckblick auf die deutschland-politischen VerhandXungen, " "issed chances? A Xook back at the German political negotiations, , in Wilfried Loth, ed. Rentenzbers, p.
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Let it just be a peaceful cormtry, That is sufficient for our purposes. The sort of country it p. The culture of distrust S. Remembers: The Last Testamrmt, p. Cmnert, Fiir Honecker alGgltrktem Parkctf, p. Nevertheless, western Europe was horrified, and western leaders became even more determined to stop Communism.
Tension remained high throughout the late s. The America and British presence in West Berlin was a huge problem for the Russians — particularly because hundreds of thousands of eastern Berliners were fleeing every month into West Berlin this was an embarrassment for the Communists, never mind the large numbers of skilled workers they were losing.
Nine days before the meeting, however, the Soviets shot down an American U2 spy plane. Although they claimed at first it was an off-course weather plane, the Americans had to admit it was a spy plane when the Russians produced the pilot, Gary Powers. As a result, the first thing Khrushchev did at the summit was to demand an apology from President Eisenhower. When Eisenhower refused, Khrushchev went home, and the summit collapsed. It was a very frightening time.
If the two sides resorted to all-out nuclear war, their stockpiles of nuclear weapons guaranteed that all life on earth would be wiped out. By , nearly 2, East Germans were fleeing into West Berlin every day. The Berlin Wall became a symbol of the Cold War. Meanwhile, the Americans were becoming more aggressive. In , the Communist leader Fidel Castro took power in Cuba. Since Cuba was only miles away from Florida, this was as much a problem for them as West Berlin was for the Russians. His actions at the Vienna summit had merely caused the Berlin Wall.
When Castro made a trade agreement with Russia, the Americans stopped trading with Cuba; in retaliation, Cuba nationalised all American-owned companies. Even worse, as a result, in September , Castro asked Russia for — and was publicly promised — weapons to defend Cuba against America. On 14 October an American U2 spy-plane took pictures of a nuclear missile base being built on Cuba. For the next fortnight, the world stood on the brink of global nuclear war. Fearing a military strike would lead to hot war, Kennedy decided to blockade Cuba.
The Russian ships thought to be carrying missiles only turned back at the last minute.
Most people in the West thought the end of the world was nigh. Just at this moment, a U2 plane was shot down in Cuba, but Kennedy decided to ignore the incident. Kennedy publicly agreed not to invade Cuba and secretly agreed to dismantle the sites in Turkey. Later, because of this, Khrushchev claimed that he won the crisis.
At the time, however, Kennedy appeared to be the victor, because the Russians had dismantled the Cuba sites.
Soon after, Khrushchev fell from power. Link: Topic Minibook. What was the Cold War. Salami tactics and the Fulton Speech During the war, Stalin had trained eastern European Communists in Russia, and after Potsdam they returned to their own countries and began to take over. Salami tactics and the Fulton speech. The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan Stalin had promised not to try to take over Greece, and he kept his word, but that did no stop Greek Communists trying to take over the government by force.
Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan. The Berlin Blockade If the opening conflicts in the Cold War were about eastern Europe, the first direct confrontation of the Cold War arose out the other source of disagreement between the allies — the treatment of Germany. Berlin Blockade. How did the Cold War develop in the period to ? Korean War. Eisenhower and Khrushchev. Poland and Hungary, Khrushchev worsened the Cold War in another way, too.
Poland and Hungary. U2 Crisis and the Berlin Wall. Anderson explores how Polish-East German relations were strained over the permanence of the Oder-Neisse border, the correct road to socialism, German repatriation from Poland, and trade policy; he provides an inside account of the heated debates that seriously divided the Polish and East German communists. Anderson delves into how and why the rift culminated in the return of the anti-Stalinist Wladyslaw Gomulka in October , and he delineates how the Polish-East German conflict undermined the unity of the Soviet bloc on its most strategic flank.
In doing so, he reveals the persistence of nationalism and ethnic prejudice in the former communist countries. In this timely text, Anderson pinpoints how nationalism has reemerged as a powerful political force following the end of the Cold War. With "A Cold War in the Soviet Bloc," Anderson markedly fills the gap in the existing scholarship on postwar relations between the countries of East Europe. Help Centre. My Wishlist Sign In Join. Be the first to write a review. Add to Wishlist.
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